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Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable
Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms
Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract
Is an accommodation “reasonable,” under the Americans with Disabilities Act, if
and only if the benefits are roughly proportional to the costs? How should benefits and
costs be assessed? Should courts asks about how much disabled employees are willing to
pay to obtain the accommodation, or instead how much they would have to be paid not to
have the accommodation? How should stigmatic or expressive harms be valued? This
essay, written for a symposium on the work of Judge Richard A. Posner, engages these
questions in a discussion of an important opinion in which Judge Posner denied
accommodations involving the lowering of a sink in a kitchenette and a request for
telecommuting. The problem with the analysis in that opinion is that it does not seriously
analyze either costs or benefits. A general lesson is that while cost-benefit balancing can
helpfully discipline unreliable intuitions about the effects of requested accommodations,
it can also incorporate those intuitions. Another lesson is that stigmatic harms and daily
humiliations deserve serious attention as part of the inquiry into which accommodations
are reasonable, and that the removal of those harms and humiliations can create real
benefits. Adequate cost-benefit analyses must attempt to measure and include those
benefits.

Richard Posner has been a colleague and a friend for over a quarter-century. Over
the years, I have learned that there is one thing he isn’t: Sentimental. A celebration of his
years on the bench inevitably invites not only sentimentality but also a lot of applause;
and we should certainly pause for some. (A terrible secret: Those of us who know Posner
well like him. Actually we like him a lot.1) But for this particular judge, I think, the best
*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science,
University of Chicago. Thanks to Christine Jolls, with whom I taught the case discussed here on two
occasions; I have learned a great deal from her emphasis on expressive harms in particular. Thanks too to
Robert Hahn, Jolls, Elizabeth Emens, and Sarah Lawsky for valuable comments on a previous draft.
1
A small story: In my first year at the University of Chicago Law School, I was invited to a little dinner
party at the house of Frank Easterbrook (not yet a federal judge). The party was dominated by George
Stigler, a Nobel Prize winner-to-be and a major figure at the university at the time. Stigler asked me what I
taught, and I responded that I taught Social Security and Welfare Law, at which point Stigler began to cast
cheerful, contemptuous ridicule on the subject. In Stigler’s view, no one in America was poor, because
even a little money ($7 a week, if memory serves) could go a very long way. This position seemed to me
not only preposterous but also offensive, and I tried to respond; but Stigler was of course Stigler, and in
addition to being a terrific debater, he wasn’t always a nice man. Seeing my distress, Posner came to the

celebration is no mere celebration. I have therefore chosen to explore the topic of costbenefit analysis and disability, with particular reference to an exceedingly influential
opinion by Judge Posner.2 In that case, Judge Posner understood the “reasonable
accommodation” requirement of the ADA to call for a form of cost-benefit balancing—
but he resolved the case without analyzing either costs or benefits.
In my view, the result of this failure was an incorrect outcome on at least one of
the two central questions in the case, and possibly on both of them. But I mean to
comment less on the particulars than on the general topic of cost-benefit analysis and
disability. As we shall see, cost-benefit balancing has some important virtues in that
domain. It helps to expose the fact that a failure to accommodate a disabled person may
stem from habit or prejudice; it properly focuses attention on the issue of potential
benefits to the disabled and potential costs to the employer; and it disciplines intuitions
that may be insufficiently anchored in reality. But at least as practiced within the
judiciary, cost-benefit analysis also has potential vices. It can operate as vessel for
unreliable intuitions rather than a way of disciplining them, and it can fail to take account
of an important aspect of discrimination, consisting of the daily humiliations of exclusion
and stigmatization. Unfortunately, Judge Posner’s opinion shows both of these vices.
My broader goal is to establish the importance of seeing those daily humiliations
as imposing significant costs, which must considered as part of the inquiry into whether a
requested accommodation is “reasonable.” The proper measurement of those costs poses
serious challenges. But a failure to consider them does a serious disservice both to costbenefit analysis and to the ADA.

rescue and made some strong points, against his long-time friend Stigler, on my behalf—less from
conviction, I’m sure, than out of kindness and sympathy for a floundering and somewhat humiliated young
colleague, whom he barely knew at the time. (I bet that Posner won’t remember this, and if he does, I bet
he’ll deny that it happened just that way. But it did.)
2
See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). The decision has been cited
360 times. (Posner taught me, among many other things, to pay attention to citation counts.)
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I. The Standard Announced
A. Facts
To begin with the facts: Lori Vande Zande suffers from a tumor of the spinal
cord, and she is paralyzed from the waist down. Her condition requires her to use a
wheelchair and leads to the development of pressure ulcers, which sometimes require her
to stay at home for weeks at a time. Vande Zande worked for the state of Wisconsin in its
housing division, performing an array of secretarial, clerical, and administrative tasks.
Because of her disability, she requested a series of accommodations. Two of these were
refused by the state, and they provided the basis for the litigation. One of the requested
accommodations was a minor change in the kitchenette in her building, which was still
under construction. Vande Zande objected that the sink and the counter in the
kitchenettes were at least 36 inches high—too high for someone in a wheelchair. She
wanted them to be lowered to 34 inches, a convenient height for her.
Vande Zande also wanted to work full time at home for a period of eight weeks,
when pressure ulcers made it impossible for her to get to work. She suggested that the
state should provide her with a desktop computer to make it possible for her to do her job
from home. Her supervisor refused her request. Nonetheless, Vande Zande worked at
home and proved able to do so for all but 16.5 hours during the eight-week period. She
took those hours from her sick leave, which she could otherwise have carried forward.
Her requested accommodation was the restoration of those 16.5 hours. On both points,
Judge Posner, writing for the court of appeals, ruled against her. In his view, neither
accommodation was reasonable.
B. Law
Vande Zande has become famous in large part for its reading of the “reasonable
accommodation” requirement, which, in Judge Posner’s view, requires attention to both
benefits and costs. This reading was hardly inevitable. The ADA does not define
“reasonable accommodation,” and another provision of the statute explicitly refers to
costs. Thus the ADA permits an employer not to yield to an employee’s accommodation
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request if the result would be an “undue hardship,”3 which is defined to include
“significant difficulty or expense”4 and to call for attention to the financial condition of
the employer. As Judge Posner noted, it is sensible to think that a hardship on the
employer is “undue” not only in the abstract, but also in relationship to the benefits.5 A
burden on the employer might not be “undue” if it is necessary to produce large benefits
for disabled workers. And if the undue hardship provision calls for an inquiry into both
costs and benefits, it may seem tempting to read “reasonable accommodation” in
precisely the narrow way that Vande Zande sought, as “apt or efficacious.”6 Perhaps the
express reference to “expense” in the undue hardship provision should be taken to
exclude the consideration of costs in deciding what counts as a “reasonable
accommodation.”
On this view, neither benefits nor costs are part of the inquiry into what makes an
accommodation “reasonable” under the ADA. The real question is whether the requested
accommodation would be well-tailored to the disability in question. A modest variation
on Vande Zande’s cost-blind approach would make costs relevant, but only in the
restricted sense that the employer is permitted to select the most cost-effective means to
the relevant end. Under this approach, there is no balancing of costs against benefits—but
an accommodation is not reasonable, and hence is not required, if it is more expensive
than necessary in order to accommodate the disability at issue. The employer is therefore
permitted to select the preferred means of accommodation, so long as the selected means
does what is necessary to accommodate the disability.
As a textual matter, an approach of this kind is entirely plausible. A cost-blind
interpretation of “reasonable accommodation,” or an interpretation that speaks only in
terms of cost-effectiveness, would be easy to defend, especially in view of the undue
hardship provision, which might be thought to be the place where any balancing of costs
and benefits must occur. Judge Posner worked hard to establish that balancing was
required under both the undue hardship and the reasonable accommodation provisions of
the statute. Unfortunately, he spent little time with the text, history, or structure of the
3

42 USC 12111.
42 USC 12111(10)(A).
5
Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 534.
6
Id. at 542.
4
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ADA; he did not carefully analyze the conventional sources of interpretation in order to
establish that in context, an accommodation is not “reasonable” if it imposes large costs
and offers small benefits. He certainly did not show that the best understanding of the
text, at the time of enactment, was that an accommodation would be unreasonable if the
costs exceeded the benefits. Instead, he pointed to the linguistic possibility that
“reasonable” softens the duty to accommodate, and he emphasized that in the ADA, the
term might have the same meaning as in the law of negligence, where both benefits and
costs are relevant.7 Saying little more, Judge Posner essentially asserted that the same is
true under the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA. But is it so clear that the
statutory term “reasonable,” in the context of a ban on disability discrimination, should
be taken in the same way as the concept in tort law? The Supreme Court has yet to rule
on the question, though an approach akin to Judge Posner’s has come to dominate the
doctrine in the lower courts.8
C. Puzzles and Valuations
Let us suppose that Judge Posner is right; certainly his conclusion is not ruled out
by the text, and it is plausibly more sensible than any alternative. But even if so, his
conclusion raises many puzzles. Must the benefits of accommodation be turned into
monetary equivalents? If so, must courts rely on the criterion of private willingness to
pay? Should courts ask how much a disabled person is willing to pay for the
accommodation in question—even though the payment, if there is to be one, will come
from the employer? What if the employee is poor, and is not able, and therefore is not
willing, to pay much for an accommodation?
An even more puzzling question: Should courts ask, not how much a disabled
person is willing to pay for an accommodation, but how much he or she would demand in
return for not being accommodated? Does willingness to pay (WTP) generate the right
number, or instead willingness to accept (WTA)? In this domain, it is entirely predictable
that there would be a large disparity between WTP and WTA. A disabled employee may
not be willing to pay a great deal to receive some accommodations; but the same

7
8

Id.
See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir 1994).
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employee might demand a lot to be deprived of them. One reason is the existence of
wealth effects: If the assignment of the right significantly affects the relative wealth of
the parties, WTP and WTA may well diverge.9 A more important reason is the
endowment effect: Because people tend to place a higher value on goods they
antecedently hold, WTA is often higher than WTP.10 For lowering the sink in Vande
Zande, it is plausible to think that the plaintiff would demand a great deal to give up any
entitlement that she might have, whether or not she would be willing to pay a lot for it in
the first instance.
More generally, it would seem quite odd to say that an accommodation will be
deemed “reasonable” only if an employee is willing to pay an amount that exceeds, or is
at least proportional to, the costs incurred by the employer. It might even seem odd to say
that an accommodation is reasonable only if the cost to the employer is roughly
proportional to the amount that the employee would demand in return for not receiving
the accommodation. But if WTP and WTA are not relevant, what is? Should we focus on
welfare as such, rather than monetary measures, if those measures point in the wrong
direction from the standpoint of welfare11?
Judge Posner does not address these questions. He does say that in interpreting the
accommodation requirement, courts (or juries) do not have to proceed in the same way as
do economists at the Office of Management and Budget. The costs and benefits do not
“always have to be quantified.”12 (But if not always, at least sometimes, or perhaps often;
and Judge Posner did not say when not, and why not.) Moreover, an accommodation
would not be “deemed unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit however slightly.
But, at the very least, the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit.”13 The words
“at the very least” are suggestive. They indicate the need for a serious inquiry into both
costs and benefits. But how is the assessment of “disproportionality” to be made, and to

9

See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 56 (5th ed. 1998).
See, eg, Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,
90 J Polit Ec 1325 (1990); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1227 (2003).
11
For an emphasis on the normative priority of welfare to monetized costs and benefits, see Matthew Adler
and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to
pay or Welfare? (unpublished manuscript 2006).
12
44 F.3d at 534.
13
Id.
10
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be disciplined? Perhaps Judge Posner believes, not implausibly, that intuition will be
enough to show, in contested cases, whether the costs are much higher than the benefits.
But it is easy to imagine difficult cases; as we shall, Vande Zande is itself an example.
In analyzing the reasonable accommodation requirement in this way, Judge
Posner carves out two independent places for consideration of costs and benefits in
disability cases. First, employees “must show that the accommodation is reasonable in the
sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs.”14 Second, the employer can show
“that upon more careful consideration the costs are excessive in relation either to the
benefits of the accommodation or to the employer’s financial survival or health.” The
second idea has distinctive importance, because an employer is allowed to establish that
even though benefits and costs are proportionate, and indeed even if costs are smaller
than benefits, there is an undue hardship by virtue of a risk to the employer’s “financial
survival or health.”15
By ensuring such a significant overlap between “undue hardship” and “reasonable
accommodation,” Judge Posner’s reading might well be challenged. Perhaps it would
have been more natural to interpret “reasonable accommodation” to require efficacy and
cost-effectiveness, and to leave cost-benefit balancing to the provision that clearly invites
it (“undue hardship”). But Judge Posner’s interpretation is certainly plausible, and if it
cannot easily be shown to be clearly right, it is also hard to demonstrate that it is wrong.
II. The Standard Applied
My principal complaint lies elsewhere. Recall that Vande Zande wanted two
things. She wanted the sinks to be lowered, at least on her floor, and she wanted her 16.5
hours of sick leave back. Wisconsin could hardly claim that yielding to those requests
would represent an undue hardship; its only hope was to claim that these
accommodations would be unreasonable. To assess that claim, Judge Posner’s opinion
requires us to know something about benefits and costs. What would be the cost of these
accommodations, and what would be the benefits?

14
15

Id. at 543.
Id.
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A. Of Sinks and Stigmas
Here is what Judge Posner says. For the kitchenette, Wisconsin would have had to
spend $150 to lower the sink on Vande Zande’s floor; for all the kitchenettes, the cost of
lowering the sinks would have been $2000 (or perhaps less).16 Judge Posner recognizes
that $150 is not a lot of money, but he nonetheless rules in favor of the state, on the
ground that an employer does not have “a duty to expend even modest amounts of money
to bring about an absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and
nondisabled workers.”17 But this claim is a conclusion, not an argument. If we are
engaging in cost-benefit analysis, why not? Where is the disproportion between the costs
and benefits? Judge Posner mentions an undeniably relevant point, which is that Vande
Zande had an available bathroom on her floor, one that also had an easily accessible sink.
For this reason, the costs of the inaccessible kitchenette sink were lower than they might
otherwise have been. If Vande Zande needed to use a sink, perhaps she should be
required to use the one in the bathroom, not the one in the kitchenette. But she responded,
very reasonably, that she wanted to use the kitchenette, not the bathroom, for such
activities as washing out her coffee cup. In any case most employees could use the
kitchenette as well as the bathroom. Hence Vande Zande objected that relegating her to
the bathroom “stigmatized her as different and inferior.”18 Removing that stigma, and the
relevant inconvenience, certainly would have been beneficial to her.
Judge Posner was willing to “assume without having to decide” that emotional
barriers to full integration into the workplace “are relevant.”19 (If we are engaged in costbenefited analysis, why assume without deciding? It seems clear that emotional barriers
are real costs, and potentially high ones.) But here, he concluded that separate but equal
was unobjectionable—even if it was not quite equal. The obvious question is: Why?
Recall that the cost of lowering the kitchenette on Vande Zande’s floor would be $150.
Surely it was an inconvenience to Vande Zande, at best, to have to go to the bathroom
when she wanted to use the kitchenette. Surely it was unpleasant, and possibly much
worse, to be excluded in this way—to be unable to use a kitchenette that was generally in
16

Id. at 546.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
17
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use. Why was the loss to Vande Zande worth less than $150—or for that matter, less than
$2000, if she sought to have access to all the kitchenettes in the building20? Where was
the cost-benefit analysis? If the state had offered her $150 pay her off, would she have
accepted it? Is that the right question?
These questions have broader implications. A standard difficulty with cost-benefit
analysis is that it may neglect costs and benefits that are not easily measured.21 The
emotional barriers to full integration are certainly difficult to turn into monetary
equivalents, or otherwise to use for purposes of formal or informal cost-benefit analysis.
But we could imagine a contingent valuation study that would make some progress.
Imagine that wheelchair-bound people were asked: “How much would you be willing to
pay to ensure the accessibility of a sink in a kitchenette on the floor on which you work?”
One problem with this question is that it does not seem to track the goals of the ADA,
which is not best understood to require accommodations only to the extent that disabled
people are willing to pay (enough) for them. A better question for a contingent valuation
study might be, “How much would you have to be paid in order to accept a situation in
which the sink in the kitchenette on the floor on which you work is inaccessible?” In any
case, the marginal value of a dollar will often be significantly lower for employers than
for employees. Should we be speaking in terms of welfare instead of dollars, at least
when dollars are an inadequate measure of welfare?
Whatever the best answers to such questions, the analysis should pick up
emotional as well as material harm. One difficulty with the contingent valuation
questions is that the answers of a single employee might tell us too little; perhaps third
parties would be benefited by the accessible sink.22 But at least the answers to that
question would provide some discipline on the inclination to trivialize, or alternatively to
exaggerate, the emotional or stigmatic harm of failures to accommodate. The broader
point is that even if measurement is difficult, a failure to consider that harm is not
defensible. If the cost of a lowering the sink were $10,000, Judge Posner’s conclusion
would certainly qualify as sensible; does it so qualify when the cost was $150?
20

Note too that an accessible kitchenette would have created benefits for other people in wheelchairs. On
third party benefits and the ADA, see Elizabeth Emens, forthcoming.
21
For an attempt to respond to this problem in an important context, see Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 977 (2004).
22
See Emens, supra note.
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B. Of Telecommuting and Teamwork
Now let us turn to the question of telecommuting and sick leave. Vande Zande
had hoped that the state would allow her to work at home, providing her with a computer
for that purpose; she sought a return of the 16.5 hours of sick leave for the work that she
was unable to do without the computer. Judge Posner rejected her claim, largely on the
broad ground that Wisconsin was under no obligation to allow Vande Zande to
telecommute at all. In his view, most jobs call for “team work under supervision,” and
there would be a substantial reduction in performance if employees worked at home.23
Judge Posner recognized that with advances in technology, this “will no doubt change.”24
But at the present time, employers are not required to permit disabled workers to
telecommute, because “their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced.”25
Because of the inevitable and large reduction in production, it was only in “a very
extraordinary case” that a jury could be asked to decide on the reasonableness of a refusal
to allow an employee work at home.26 Judge Posner adds that the expected cost of the
loss to Vande Zande must “surely be slight,” because it is possible that she will not ever
need the 16.5 hours of sick leave.27
Talk about casual empiricism! If the question is whether the costs of the
accommodation are disproportionate to the benefits, we might want to make some kind of
serious inquiry into both costs and benefits. What is the evidence that if workers
telecommute, “their productivity will inevitably be greatly reduced?” In assessing
benefits, do we ask how much disabled people are willing to pay to telecommute? Or do
we ask much they would have to be paid to be denied the right to telecommute? More
particularly: What is the evidence that Vande Zande’s own productivity was reduced?
Did her productivity fall during the eight-week period in which she worked at home?
What, in fact, is the nature of her job, such that “team work under supervisors” is
required? It would seem important to ask and answer that question to assess her request
to telecommute. But Judge Posner does not inquire.
23

44 F.3d at 544.
Id.
25
Id. at 545.
26
Id.
27
Id.
24
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With respect to the benefits of the accommodation: What do we know about
Vande Zande’s history, such that the loss of 16.5 hours of sick leave can be dismissed as
a “slight” loss? In light of her medical problems, a certain number of hours of sick leave
would appear to be more important to her than to most people. What, in fact, is the
monetary value of 16.5 hours of sick leave? Recall that Vande Zande wanted the use of a
desktop computer for a period of eight weeks; if she had been accommodated, she would
not have had to use her sick leave. How much would it have cost Wisconsin to provide
such a computer? Surely the cost would be low; perhaps it would be close to nothing.
(Perhaps the state, like many large employers, had an extra computer in an unused
office.) If we are engaging in casual empiricism, we might offer a speculation: The cost
of six weeks of use of a computer, or of restoration of 16.5 hours of sick leave, is not
“disproportionate” to the benefit. This conclusion might be strengthened if we focus, with
particularity, on Vande Zande’s particular condition.
But I am not at all sure that Judge Posner was wrong to hold against Vande Zande
on the sick leave issue. The problem is that he did not seriously ask the questions that, on
his view, the statute required. Instead he relied on a kind of intuition, to the effect that
workers must be supervised—just as he relied on the even less helpful (because
platitudinous and irrelevant) intuition that employers need not “expend even modest
amounts of money to bring about an absolute identity in working conditions between
disabled and nondisabled workers.” In the very case in which Judge Posner established
that a kind of cost-benefit analysis lies at the heart of the requirement of reasonable
accommodation, he did not analyze costs and benefits, and he certainly made no
systematic effort to compare the two.
III. The Lessons
Might we draw some broader lessons?
A. Juries
A tempting lesson is that the reasonableness of the requested accommodations
might well have been left to the jury—a conclusion that would have more general
implications. If the lowering of the sink and the telecommuting questions presented
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problems on which reasonable people might differ, perhaps the jury should have been
asked to solve them, after being presented with the right instruction. In defense of this
course of action, it might be thought that the conscience of the community is properly
brought to bear on the difficult questions about whether the costs were disproportionate
to the benefits.
On the other hand, there are serious risks here. It is possible that the jury would
have been excessively sympathetic to a disabled person, responding to her general
situation rather than the particular issue. Perhaps the focus on the particular person would
distort application of cost-benefit analysis, or any other test, in a way that would result in
pro-plaintiff rulings that would be difficult to justify. Or perhaps the same prejudice and
stereotyping that motivated the ADA would rematerialize at the level of jury judgments.
Perhaps hostility to disabled people, or indifference to their situation, would distort the
application of cost-benefit analysis, or any other test, in a way that would result in prodefendant rulings that would be hard to justify. These risks are sufficient to raise real
questions about the idea that the hardest ADA issues should be settled by juries, certainly
where cost-benefit analysis of any kind is involved.
We need to know much more about how juries handle questions submitted to
them under the ADA.28 There is a great deal of room for further conceptual and empirical
work here. But in my view, the most important lessons of Vande Zande lie elsewhere.
The first involves the value of cost-benefit analysis; the second involves its limitations.
B. Costs, Benefits, and Intuitions
In the context of disability and elsewhere, both employers and public officials
(not excluding judges) often have exceedingly strong intuitions, suggesting the
impracticality or even absurdity of claims for accommodation. Consider those who seek
medical leave for a certain period, or who need a special parking space, or who need a
flexible and adjusted schedule at work, or who need help in lifting heavy objects, or who
are infected with some kind of disease. Many such people might seem, to some, to be
essentially incapable of working, and either before or after the ADA, their request might

28

For relevant discussion, see Brian Prestes, Disciplining the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Direct
Threat Defense, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 409 (2001).
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be resisted because of its novelty and because of baseless fears of contagion or nearly
baseless fears of spiraling costs (and also because of an absence of empathetic
identification with those who suffer from the relevant conditions). A great virtue of costbenefit analysis, or a proportionality test, is that it puts the resistance to its proof. Perhaps
employers and public officials have been insufficiently imaginative. Having produced
practices that fit the majority who are not disabled, there is a natural resistance to
changing them for the benefit of people whose basic capacities are (often wrongly) in
doubt.
There are two qualifications. First, an accommodation might be required under
the ADA even if its costs outweigh its benefits—as Judge Posner signals in Vande Zande.
(The ADA does not enact Mr. Kaldor-Hicks’ understanding of economic efficiency.29)
Even if the cost of an accommodation is (say) $2500, an employer might be required to
make the accommodation, as (for example) by hiring personal assistants.30 Judge Posner
calls for a rough proportionality test, not a cost-benefit test. Second, market pressures
should provide some help here. If disabled people are truly able to provide benefits in
excess of costs, they might well be hired. Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to this
happy story of self-correcting markets, not least because of prejudice on the part of
employers, employees, and customers alike.31
A signal virtue of some kind of weighing of costs and benefits is that it can
demonstrate that erroneous intuitions, or hostility and prejudice, are beneath the surface.
How much of a burden would have been imposed by eight weeks of telecommuting?
Why not lower sinks to 24 inches, so that they can be used by people with wheelchairs—
especially if the cost is usually around $150? A virtue of an inquiry into costs and
benefits, and of a comparison of the two, is that it makes it possible to test intuitions, and
practices, by reference to reality.

29

Cf. Lochner v. New York (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics”). Of course Kaldor and Hicks were two different economists, not one, but perhaps
we can merge them to echo Holmes as faithfully as possible.
30
See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 1995).
31
See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 21 (1991).
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C. Intractable Intuitions and Stigmatic Harms
Nonetheless, Judge Posner held against Vande Zande—with a brisk, conclusory,
and inadequate analysis of the issue of telecommuting, and a brief, conclusory, and quite
unconvincing analysis of the issue of lowering the sinks. This presents a bit of a puzzle,
because Judge Posner is ordinarily far more systematic with both costs and benefits. The
explanation, I believe, lies in two places, both of which require qualification of the most
ambitious claims of cost-benefit enthusiasts in this domain (and perhaps elsewhere).
The first problem is that cost-benefit analysis might incorporate intuitions rather
than disciplining them. Without a method for calculating costs or benefits, analysts are
likely to rely on their own hunches and speculations. Recall Judge Posner’s casual
empiricism with respect to telecommuting, with his suggestion that workers need to
perform in teams with supervisors, lest their productivity be “greatly” diminished. The
most sympathetic reading of this discussion is that he is, in fact, doing a form of costbenefit analysis, with a (reasonable) judgment that the costs of telecommuting are likely
to be high. (Put to one side the fact that Vande Zande would have been satisfied with the
restoration of her 16.5 hours of sick leave.) But there appears to be no systematic
evidence on that question. Without such evidence, a judge—even one sympathetic to
cost-benefit analysis and to empiricism—is likely to fall back on intuitions.
Unfortunately, those intuitions may be a product of some kind of prejudice, in the form
not of bigotry, but of an insufficiently reflective belief that standard workplace
practices—even those that come down hard on disabled people—are entirely reasonable.
If so, cost-benefit analysis, used to help determine which accommodations are
“reasonable,” does not cure the underlying problem. On the contrary, it incorporates and
perpetuates that problem.
The second problem is at least as fundamental. With respect to the lowering of the
sink, Vande Zande had two concerns. The first was practical: If the goal is to wash a
coffee cup, or to get a drink of water, it is probably most pleasant and convenient to be
able to use a kitchenette, not the bathroom. The second involved stigma. If most people
are able to use the sink in the kitchenette, it is not merely convenient to be able to use that
sink; it is stigmatizing and in a way humiliating to have to use the bathroom instead.
Judge Posner trivialized these concerns. But for an employee, the use of the sink, in the
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kitchenette on the floor, may be a matter of daily routine, and it is no light thing to have
to resort to the place in which employees generally do other sorts of things (not to put too
fine a point on it). To this extent, the harm in Vande Zande was expressive and symbolic.
Cost-benefit analysis cannot easily take such harms on board. But there is no
question that those harms greatly matter; people may be willing to pay a great deal to
avoid them, or demand a great deal not to be subjected to them. (I think that in any case,
their value was at least $150 in Vande Zande.) It is plausible to say that what most
matters is welfare, not willingness to pay, and the willingness to pay of disabled workers
may not give a sufficient account of the welfare effects of stigma and humiliation. There
is no question that an adequate analysis of costs and benefits would count expressive and
symbolic harms, because their welfare effects are real and sometimes large.
If an understanding of “reasonable accommodation” does not attend to expressive
harms, it does a serious disservice to both adequate cost-benefit analysis and the ADA.32
Here, I believe, is the most basic problem with Judge Posner’s opinion in Vande Zande;
and it is a problem to be avoided in future treatments of the requirement of reasonable
accommodation.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Cass Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@uchicago.edu
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Cf. note 1, supra.
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